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1 Introduction
The marketplace, known in a traditional form as the market square or bazaar, is the oldest
trading system in human history. These kinds of marketplaces now play a diminished
role in developed countries following the emergence of big business. Yet even today in
many developing countries, the main actors in trade remain numerous small buyers and
sellers. Marketplaces support transactions between these small traders, and although
marketplaces might appear simple, they nonetheless play a key role in trade within and
between developing countries (Bellandi and Lombardi 2012; Ding 2012; Geertz, Geertz,
and Rosen 1979; Ito 2011; Iwasaki 2012). The aim of this paper is to re-examine the nature
of marketplace, for the rst time from the perspective of the new economic geography.
Here we focus not on the transaction space of the marketplace itself, but on the trading
system behind the physical space.
As the worlds largest marketplace for daily necessities, Yiwu China Commodity City
(Yiwu Market) symbolizes the vitality of marketplaces. Yiwu Market is located within
Yiwu, in the middle of Zhejiang Province, China. Thirty years ago, this marketplace was
a street market with a mere 700 booths. By 2012, however, Yiwu Market had grown into
a huge marketplace with a total oor area of 4.7 million square meters and 70,000 booths.
If one were to stay at each booth for three minutes and devote eight hours per day to
purchasing, it would take more than a year to visit the entire market.
For hundreds of years, Yiwu has historically been host to long-distance traders. In
1982, when the Yiwu government established a regular market, these traders became the
major buyers and sellers in this marketplace.
Since 1982 the transaction volume of Yiwu Market has increased explosively, by a fac-
tor of more than 1300. At rst, commodities traded in the marketplace were all purchased
from factories in Zhejiang Province and Guangdong Province, where rural industrializa-
tion advanced earliest in China; and all the commodities were then sold in the domestic
Chinese market. Now, however, 10% of commodities sold at Yiwu Market are purchased
directly from foreign merchants and 65% of the commodities are exported.
At rst most traders were from Yiwu, but over time, traders from other regions came
to constitute the majority. Moreover, the change in the number of booths 705 in 1982,
16,000 in 1992, 42,000 in 2002, and 70,000 in 2011 shows that the number of sellers is
continuing to rise. Data on the number of buyers are incomplete, but data on the daily
number of visitors are available for four years: 10,000 in 1990, 110,000 in 1998, 160,000
in 2002, and 214,000 in 2007. Thus we can see that the number of buyers increased along
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with the number of sellers. The number of foreign buyers has continuously increased. In
2007, a total of 260,000 foreign buyers visited Yiwu. Many of them reside permanently in
Yiwu and have established o¢ ces in the city. From 2007 to 2011, the number of foreign
resident o¢ ces in Yiwu increased from 1,340 to 3,080.
With increased numbers of buyers and sellers having come to Yiwu, many marketplaces
dealing in the same types of commodities have shrunk or even disappeared. This trend
rst appeared in areas surrounding Yiwu. For example, the Qiaotou Market in Wenzhou,
Zhejiang Province, was the largest button market in Asia in the late 1980s and early
1990s. In the mid-2000s, however, all 400 local button factories operated booths at Yiwu
Market, and the numbers of booths at Qiaotou Market decreased from 4,000 to a mere
500. A similar situation has also occurred in Taizhou, Zhejiang Province. Luqiao China
Daily-Necessities City in Taizhou was Chinas largest plastic goods market in the 1990s.
With the growth of Yiwu Market, however, transaction volume of the market in Taizhou
decreased from 11.6 billion yuan (2001) to 9.05 billion yuan (2004). Meanwhile, 300
Taizhou rms have made Yiwu Market their major sales channel, where half of the plastic
products produced in Taizhou are sold.
The emergence of Yiwu Market also had a signicant impact on marketplaces in other
developing countries. Ito (2011) reported a typical case where a Kenyan buyer, who
had previously made purchases in marketplaces in Dubai, began going directly to Yiwu
Market for purchasing. Through an analysis of data on foreign resident o¢ ces , Ding
(2012: Chapter 6) pointed out that the daily necessities traders in Dubai and Hong Kong
(most of whom operate booths in marketplaces) have begun to shift to Yiwu. Iwasaki
(2012) reported an interesting phenomenon where many apparel businesses in Iran who
previously sold garments through Bazar-e Bozorg in Teheran have given up production,
and now go to Yiwu (and Guangzhou) to purchase garments directly.
A key factor that attracts buyers and sellers to agglomerate in Yiwu is its great variety
of commodities. At Yiwu Market, commodities are rigorously classied by industry and
location, thus making search costs in the market comparatively low and facilitating a
greater variety of commodities. In 1998, the market was classied into 16 zones, where
30,000 types of commodities in 28 industries were traded. Thereafter, the number of
commodity types continued to increase to more than 100,000 in 2002, 320,000 in 2004,
and 1,700,000 in 2011.
The purpose of our model is to clarify the mechanism by which buyers and sellers
attract each other. Circular causality between consumers and rms or between inter-
mediate goods suppliers and their customers is employed in New Economic Geography,
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(e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999) in multi-regional general equilibrium models
to examine the emergence of the core-periphery structure. However, circular causality
including the search process has not been examined. To make this complex problem
tractable, we focus on marketplace formation in the spatial economy of a linear spatial
economy with exogenously determined locations of marketplaces.
The formation of marketplaces without circular causality is well understood. By solv-
ing social plannersoptimization problem, Wang (1990) has shown that a unique equilib-
rium marketplace that maximizes social welfare is lacated near the residences of buyers
who prefer spatial factors. Wolinsky (1983) developed a monopolistic competition model
of buyer searches, under the assumption that the marketplace and place of residence are
separated; this model admitted a clustered market area and allowed for examination of
whether a shop emerges outside the marketplace. Fischer and Harrington (1996) extended
the search model of Wolinsky (1983) and derived the circumstances whereby some rms
cluster but where many more are located away from the cluster as a result of the entry and
exit of rms. Anderson and Renault (1999) derived the required model setup for the exis-
tence of equilibrium under monopolistic competition and other cases, rigorously examining
Wollinsky (1986) from the view point of industrial organization. Konishi and Sandfort
(2003) examined externalities produced by an anchor store with an established brand
name. In a two-dimensional geographic space, Konishi (2005) used numerical analysis to
examine the relationship between the number of stores at a shopping center, equilibrium
price, market size, the probability of a buyer nding a purchasable commodity, and store
prot.
The circular causality of our model emerges by the interaction between buyers and
sellers. Many sellers in a marketplace attract buyers who live far from the marketplace and
who expect good matching in marketplaces. Meanwhile, many buyers in a marketplace
increase the capital returns of sellers through increased demand for products. However,
sellers may hesitate to enter the marketplace because of the competition among them.
Buyers may hesitate to make the trip to the marketplace.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 constructs our model;
Section 3 establishes and characterizes the spatial equilibrium; and Section 4 concludes
the paper.
3
2 The Model
The economy is an ad hoc marketplace where goods are bought and sold. We restrict
ourselves to transactions conducted in only a single marketplace in a linear city. There
is a population L of consumers who reside along line [0; L]. The marketplace is located
at the origin of the line (0). The distance between the marketplace and buyer l 2 [0; 1]
is measured by lL.1 We suppose that absentee capital owners posess, in total, N units of
capital. We denote by  2 [0; 1] the share of capital employed by sellers in the marketplace.
To produce a product, one unit of capital is used and the marginal cost is zero, which
implies that sellers utilize increasing returns to scale technology. We assume that sellers
can di¤erentiate their products at no cost and also assume that there is no economy of
scope; there is thus a one-to-one correspondence between rms and varieties. Hence, there
is a continuum [0; N ] of horizontally di¤erentiated products in the marketplace. Seller i
o¤ers one variety at price pi.
The indirect utility of buyer l purchasing one unit of variety i at price pi is given by:2
uli(pi) = y   pi + li
where y   pi is the amount of numéraire consumed,  is a parameter expressing the
heterogeneity of buyerstaste and li 2 [0; N ] 3 is the expectation of a random variable
that is identically and independently distributed across buyers and sellers, with a common
density function f and the corresponding distribution function F . Hence, li is the
consumer ls match value with variety i. As  becomes larger, the impact of search on
buyers becomes greater. In other words, buyers perceive varieties in the marketplace to be
more heterogeneous. We assume that f is a continuous uniform distribution over convex
sets:
f(x) =
1
N
; x 2 [0; N ]
where x  lj + (p   pj)=, and p is the equilibrium price. According to Andersen and
Renoult (1999), there exists an equilibrium under monopolistic competition if the density
function f is log concave.4 The continuous uniform distribution over convex sets is also
1Each buyer is bound to its place of residence, which means that the buyer cannot relocate.
2We assume that each buyer purchases only one variety and consumes one unit of the product. In
reality, the major buyers in Yiwu Market are small merchants. For this reason, we believe that our
denition of buyers is reasonable in the case of the buyers at Yiwu Market.
3In other words, we suppose that a greater number of varieties in the marketplace improves the upper
value of matching.
4Log concave implies that log f(x+ (1  )y)   log f(x) + (1  ) log f(y);  2 (0; 1) is satised.
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log concave. Thus, an equilibrium may exist in this model.
Buyers incur a search (or sampling) cost c when checking a sellers product and price.
The net utility of buyer l is given by uli(pi)  kc if the buyer purchases product i at price
pi after visiting k sellers. In equilibrium, all sellers charge the same price p. Furthermore,
the expected indirect utility of the buyer l who purchases a product in the marketplace
is:
U(; l) =  p + E   kc  tlL. (1)
where E is the expected match value. Otherwise buyer l receives positive utility, V > 0,
by not traveling to the marketplace. We use  to express a buyer who is indi¤erent
between traveling to the marketplace and staying put, that is,
U(; l)

l=
= V
Hence, buyers l   will travel to the marketplace.
Assuming free entry and exit, and setting the zero prot condition yields the capital
return:
r(; ) = pD(p; p) (2)
where D(p; p) represents the demand for a variety in equilibrium; the demand in equi-
librium will be formulated later. We assume that the prevailing returns to capital outside
the marketplace are r. Accordingly, the owners of capital are indi¤erent between being
employed by sellers inside and outside the marketplace if the following equation holds:
r(; ) = r.
Following a well-established convintion in migration modeling, we focus on an adjustment
process whereby the marketplace attracts (repuls) capital providing higher (lower) return
to capital and higher (lower) utility for buyers: _
_

=

r(; )  r
U(; )  V

(3)
We assume that the search process in the marketplace instantaneous, but that decisions
on whether to utilize capital in the marketplace and whether to buy at the marketplace
take longer.
5
2.1 Reservation value
Suppose that a buyer receives a best o¤er that provides utility ulj(pj). If the buyer samples
seller i and expects price p from that seller, the buyer will prefer to buy the product if
 p+li >  pj+lj holds, which is equivalent to x  lj+(p pj)= > li. Hence, the
utility gained by sampling an additional seller is given by  p+li+pj lj = (li x).
Furthermore, the expected marginal utility of searching an additional seller is expressed
as g(x) and the value of x when the buyer stops searching, bx, is given by
c= = g(bx); g(x)  Z N
x
(  x)f()d
Here g(x) is the expected value of nding a better match than x. The expected marginal
utility from an additional search exceeds the search cost if x < bx, and vice versa. Solving
c= = g(bx) yields bx() = N  r2N c

. (4)
If  goes to innity or c goes to 0, we obtain bx = N , which is the maximum value of li.
In other words, buyers never stop searching when the varieties are highly di¤erentiated
or the search cost is trivial. Furthermore we obtain:
N
2
R c

, bx() R 0. (5)
If bx  0, buyers always purchase the rst product found because the varieties are fairly
standardized or the search cost is extremely high. To avoid the extreme case where buyers
always purchase a product at the rst seller visited, we assume that the following condition
is satised:
N
2
>
c

: (6)
This implies bx() > 0. Otherwise, we will show that the indirect utility is negative
when buyers visit the marketplace, which implies that no buyer travels to the market.
Furthermore, from (4), we have 0 < @bx()
@
< N , which implies that the reservation value
increases as the number of sellers increases, owing to the increased maximum match value.
Furthermore, @N @bx()
@
> 0 implies that the gap N x^() increases as  increases. Hence,
the more sellers present in the marketplace, the earlier buyers will stop their search.
2.2 Prices
Suppose that, for a given number of sellers and buyers, all rms set price p except for
rm i, given the number of rms and consumers. It is optimal for buyers, when sampling
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seller i, to use the search rule described in the previous subsection, as in the model of
Anderson and Renault (1999).
After seller i is sampled, the probability that a buyer stays with seller i without
performing any further search is:
Pr[x > bx()] = 1  F [bx() + ],
where   (pi()  p())= is the standardized price premium of seller i. To determine
the probability that seller i is sampled, we focus on the distribution function of another
seller sampled before seller i but where no purchase was made, that is, F [bx()]. Seller i is
sampled rst with 1=(N), second with probability F [bx()]=(N), third with probability
F (bx)2=(N), and so on. Summing these probabilities, we obtain the total probability
1
N
1 F [bx()]N
1 F [bx()] . Since N is su¢ ciently large, we can rewrite the above probability as
1
N
1
1 F [bx()] . Therefore, the probability that seller i is sampled is 1N 11 F [bx()] , and that the
sellers o¤er is accepted, 1  F [bx() + ], which results in 1
N
[1  F [bx() + ]] 1
1 F [bx()] .
Since no buyer can sample all sellers, the number of buyers or the demand for seller i is
D(pi(); p
()) =
^L
N
f1  F [bx() + ]g 1
1  F [bx()] .
From (4), we obtain the probability that a buyer does not purchase a particular product:
F [bx()] = 1 s c=
N=2
: (7)
The derivative of demand for seller i with respect to pi, evaluated at pi = p, is obtained:5
@D(p; p)
@pi
=  L

s
N
2c=
< 0: (8)
Since all sellers charge the same price in equilibrium, demand for each seller is given by:
D(p; p) =
L
N
: (9)
The equilibrium demandD(p; p) increases with the number of buyers and decreases with
the number of sellers. Accordingly, we can derive p() = f1 F [bx()]g
f [bx()] under monopolistic
competition as in the appendix of Anderson and Renault (1999). Thus, the symmetric
equilibrium price is6
5It is readily veried that @[1 F (bx+)]@p =   f(bx) . Hence, we can arrive at (8).
6MR = D + p@D@p = 0, pi =  D@D=@pi
p = [1 F (bx)]f(bx) = [1 (1 
p
2( c )=N)]
1
N
=
p
2cN
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p() =
p
2cN . (10)
The equilibrium price increases with the search cost, c, as in Proposition 1 of Anderson
and Renault (1999), and also increases with product di¤erentiation, , as in Proposition 2
of Anderson and Renault (1999). The equilibrium price (10) also increases with the num-
ber of sellers, N .7 According to the results of Anderson and Renault (1999), however,
price is lower with an increasing number of sellers is increasing in comparison with when
the number of sellers is nite or innite. We consider the marginal increase among only
sellers that are su¢ ciently large. As Fischer and Harrington (1996) point out, the di¤er-
ence between the upper matching value and the lower matching value corresponds to the
degree of product heterogeneity. Supposing the number of sellers is innite, we suppose
li2 [0; N ]. Thus, we obtain the above result. In our set-up, a higher matching value
means greater product heterogeneity. In (10), buyers perceive that product heterogeneity
increases with .
2.3 Number of visits
A buyer continues searching until nding a product such that x > bx(). Otherwise, the
buyer will continue to search. Hence, the probability that a buyer stops searching on
the rst visit is 1  F [bx()]; second visit, F [bx()]f1  F [bx()]g; third visit, F [bx()]2f1 
F [bx()]g; and so on. We obtain the expected number of visits as
ke = f1  F [bx()]g nX
i=1
iF [bx()]i 1.
Because the number of sellers is su¢ ciently large, we use (7) to obtain8
ke() =
1
1  F [bx()] =
s
N=2
c=
. (11)
We nd that the buyer samples more products if the variety is greater, if the cost of an
additional search is lower, and if the products are perceived to be more heterogeneous.
7The segmentation of the marketplace by product reduces prices such that p =
p
2cN=s, where s
is the number of segments.
8It is straightforward, as follows:
1X
M=0
MF (bx)M 1 = lim
M!1
MF (bx)M+1  MF (bx)M   F (bx)M + 1
(F (bx)  1)2 = 1[1  F (bx)]2 ; F (bx) < 1:
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Under (6), we have ke() > 1. Furthermore, using (7), the expected number of sellers
visited is the inverse of the probability that the buyer purchases a product and stops
searching. For example, if the probability is 1=3, a buyers expected number of sellers
visited is 3.
Furthermore, using (4) and (11), we obtain:
p() = [N   x^()] = 2cke().
In other words, the price increases when a larger number of varieties can be purchased,
N   x^ and with greater sampling, ke().
Proposition 1 A larger number of varieties that can be purchased is equivalent to broader
sampling and increased product prices.
3 Instantaneous equilibrium
Using (2), (9) and (10), the capital return is given by:
r(; ) = p()D [p(); p()] = L
r
2c
N
. (12)
When the number of sellers in a marketplace increases, the e¤ect of decreasing demand
dominates the e¤ect of increasing price. That is, the capital return decreases as the
number of sellers increases. However, capital returns increases because of higher demand
when the number of customers is higher. Thus, more sellers are attracted to a larger pool
of buyers. Using the implicit function theorem and (10), we obtain
@
@
=
2

R 1, 2 R =.
Thus, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Home market magnication occurs when 2 > =.
The condition for home market magnication is satised on 75 % of domain (; ).
Thus, if  is not too small in comparison with , home market magnication occurs.
Notice that no parameters except  and  have an e¤ect on home market magnication.
Setting r(; ) = r yields:
() =
r
L
s
N
2c
 	r(). (13)
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Since  is a square root function of , the function emanates from the origin with gradually
decreasing positive slope.
Since buyers purchase a product such that lj 2 [bx; N ], we obtain
E =
Z N
bx

N   bxd = N  
s
cN
2
.
Thus, substituting (10) and (11) into (1), the expected utility of buyer l =  is given by:
U(; ) =  2
p
2cN + N   tL. (14)
The rst term on the right-hand side of (14) is the sum of costs stemming from the
price and sampling cost. If (6) is not satised, (14) implies U(; ) < 0 and so no buyer
travels to the marketplace. If (6) is satised, we obtain @U=@ > 0. That is, the larger
market enables the attraction of buyers located further from the marketplace. Setting
U(; ) = V yields:
() =
1
tL

  4
p
2cN + N   V

 	U(), (15)
From (15), we have:
@
@
=
1
tL
 
N  
r
2cN

!
;
@2
@2
> 0.
It is readily veried that 	U() is monotonically increasing and a convex function on  2
[0; 1]; ++as  increases,++ 	U() initially decreases and then increases with a negative
minimum value, whereas 	r() is monotonically increasing and concave on 	r() 2 [0; 1]
( 2 [0; 1]cut). It is easily veried that 	r(0) > 	U(0). Hence, there is a unique solution
(; ) 2 (0;+1) (0;+1) of the system given by (13) and (15).
Solving (13) and (15), we obtain the unique solution (; ) as follows:
 =
1
8c3N
h
rt+ 4c+
p
(rt+ 4c)2 + 8c2V
i2
, (16)
 =
r
4c2L
h
rt+ 4c+
p
(rt+ 4c)2 + 8c2V
i
. (17)
We conduct a comparative analysis of  and  in the following section. Examining
  1 and   1, we obtain the su¢ cient condition for (; ) as follows:
min

L
r
  2

2c
r
  t

L;


p
N   rt+ 4cp
2c
p
N

> V . (18)
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In other words, an interior solution is avoided by the following: (i) the large opportunity
cost of buyers visiting the marketplace, (ii) the large opportunity cost of capital returns,
(iii) the large cost of commuting to the marketplace, and (iv) a small number of buyers
and sellers.
4 Stability
4.1 Interior solutions
We now turn to examine the stability of an interior solution (; ). Using (12) and (14),
linearizing (3) on (; ) yields:
 :

:


= A

  
   

; A 
 
a11 a12
a21 a22
!
=
0@   L p c2N Lq 2cN
N  
q
2cN
  tL
1A .
Matrix A expresses the agglomeration forces and dispersion forces. The agglomeration
forces correspond to a circular causality between sellers and buyers in this model. As
the number of buyers increases, the demand for variety increases and thus higher capital
returns are realized, as in a12 > 0. Hence, each seller has an incentive to o¤er products
in the marketplace. In a21, there are both agglomeration forces and dispersion forces:
(i) the expected match value increases as the number of sellers increases, that is, N
(agglomeration force) in a21; (ii) the selling price and sampling cost increase as the number
of sellers increases, that is,  p2cN= (dispersion force) in a21. Although the sign of
a21 can be negative if c is large and  is small, agglomeration force dominates dispersion
force if a21 > 0, and vice versa. The other two dispersion forces arise from lower demand
for variety due to competition among sellers, as in a11 < 0, and from the distance between
a buyers residence and the marketplace being longe, as in a22 < 0.
Using (15), the determinant of A is given by
jAj = L
p
2cp
N
 
tL
2
  N +
r
2cN

!
. (19)
Substituting (15) into (19), we obtain jAj =   V
2   N2 < 0.9 Hence, the interior
solution (; ) is a saddle point. The negative determinant implies that a21 > 0. Fur-
thermore, because the second term in the brackets of (19) is negative, it dominates the
9For jAj > 0, V <  N is necessary. If this condition is satised, the economy is stable.
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other two terms. That is, positive feedback or circular causality between the agglomera-
tion of buyer and sellers in a marketplace.
Furthermore, the trace of A is
Tr(A) =   
L
p
c

p
2N
  tL < 0.
By some simple calculations, we also obtain Tr(A)2   4jAj > 0, which implies that
there exist real eigenvalues !1 > 0 and
!2 =
1
2
0@  Lpc

p
2N
  tL 
s
L
p
c

p
2N
+ tL
2
+ 2

V

+
N
2
1A < 0. (20)
Solving AV = !2V where V  [v; 1]0, we obtain
v =
L
p
2cp
N
L
p
c

p
2N
+ !2
.
Using (20), it is readily verify that v < 0, which implies that the stable saddle path
of (; ) is downward-sloping around (; ). This implies that, if the economy shifts
slightly from (; ), circular causality acts in two directions: increases in buyers and sell-
ers intensify the attraction of the marketplace for both; and decreases in buyers and sellers
weaken the attraction of the marketplace for both. As a result, this process may maintain
the agglomeration of buyers and sellers, or otherwise lead to the complete disappearance
of the marketplace.
4.2 Corner solutions
Since the interior solution is not stable if the economy is not on the stable saddle path, we
must nd other equilibrium conditions. Focusing on the cases of  = 1 and/or  = 1,10
the corner solutions can be divided into four cases: (i)  =  = 1, (ii)  = 1 and
 2 [0; 1], (iii)  2 [0; 1] and  = 1, and (iv)  =  = 0.
In case (i), we examine the stability conditions for  =  = 1, given as follows:
r(1; 1) > r, U(1; 1) > V .
10It is readily veried that the corner solutions of  = 0 or  = 0 is unstable due to _ < 0 if  = 0 or
_ < 0 if  = 0.
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Hence, the corner solution  =  = 1 is an equilibrium if and only if:
r <
L
p
2cp
N
; V <  2
p
2cN + N   tL. (21)
In other words, the opportunity cost of renting capital r and the opportunity cost of
visiting a marketplace, V , must be very low. Furthermore, the commuting cost t should
be low enough to attract buyers to visit the marketplace. By some simple calculations,
(21) can be rewritten as follows:
r
p
Np
2c
< L <
 2p2cN + N   V
t
.
Hence, if L is very small, we have

 < 0, which implies that some capital will not be used
in the marketplace; if L is very large, we have

 < 0, which implies that some buyers
who are located far away from the marketplace will not travel to the marketplace. In the
above two cases, the corner solution  =  = 1 is unstable and not an equilibrium.
In case (ii), the equilibrium conditions are (a) 	U(1) < 1, and (b) 	r(1) < 	U(1).
Solving  = 	U(1), we obtain
 =
1
tL

 2
p
2cN + N   V

.
As such, 	U(1) < 1 yields:
 2
p
2cN + N   tL < V ,  2
p
2cN + N   V
t
< L. (22)
That is, a larger population satises (22). Furthermore, 	r(1) < 	U(1) yields:
p
N


p
N   rt+ 4cp
2c

> V . (23)
In case (iii), the equilibrium conditions are (a) 	 1r (1) < 1 and (b) 	
 1
r (1) < 	
 1
U (1).
Solving  = 	 1r (1) yields:
 =
L
r
r
2c
N
.
Solving 	 1r (1) < 1 yields:
L
r
2c
N
> r , L < r
p
Np
2c
. (24)
10To satisfy the condition r
p
Np
2c
<  2
p
2cN+N V
t , the mass of capital N must be su¢ ciently large.
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The smaller number of potential buyers L satises (24). Furthermore, 	 1r (1) < 	
 1
U (1)
yields
L

L
r
  2

2c
r
  t

> V . (25)
This condition is not satised if the total number of buyers L is too small. Finally, in case
(iv), using (14), we nd that indirect utility, excluding the commuting cost, U(; ) tL <
0, becomes negative if  < 8c
N
. Thus, (0; 0) is always stable. We can summarize the above
results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 1. There exists an interior solution if (18) is satised. The economy has
equilibria that displays one of the following three patterns: (i) if (21) is satised, there
are two corner solutions ( =  = 0 and  =  = 1) and one interior solution; (ii) if
(22) and (23) are satised, there are two equilibria (  =  = 0 and  = 1;  2 (0; 1)),
and one interior solution; (iii) if (24) and (25) are satised, there are two equilibria
( =  = 0 and  2 (0; 1),  = 1) and one interior solution. However, the interior
solutions in cases (i), (ii), and (iii) are always saddle points, which are unstable.
2. If (18) is not satised, there is only one corner solution  =  = 0.
The three cases in the rst part of the above proposition can be divided according to
the potential number of buyers L. If the potential number of buyers L is relatively small,
not all of the capital K is employed in the marketplace. However, if the potential number
of buyers L is very large, some buyers choose not to visit the marketplace.
The last part of the above proposition is important because it means that the formation
of a marketplace requires satisfying (18). For example, by lowering commuting costs to
the market t or by increasing the potential size of buyers L, the condition (18) is satised.
However, the market might not be established, depending upon the initial point (, ).
To explain this, the phase diagram in Fig. 1 is useful. The domain (, ) is divided by
the lines expressing a pair (, ) such that
:
 = 0 and
:
 = 0. In this gure, condition
(18) is satised and then the interior solution exists in the gure. If the initial point is on
A(B), for example, where both  and  are relatively large and  >  (  > ). Firstly,
the number of buyers decreases (increases) and the number of sellers increases (decreases)
and then both increase. Finally, buyers and sellers establish a large market:  =  = 1.
However, if the initial point is on C(D), then  or  is too small. As the number of buyers
decreases (increases) and the number of sellers increases (decreases), no trade will emerge
in the marketplace:  =  = 0.
Both A and B  and both C and D in the gure  are divided by the stable saddle
path, which is expressed as the line passing the intersection point of two lines
:
 = 0 and
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: = 0. The intersection point is a saddle point that shifts to the north-east by increasing
t, V and r, as follows:11
@
@t
> 0;
@
@V
> 0;
@
@r
> 0; (26)
@
@t
> 0;
@
@V
> 0;
@
@r
> 0. (27)
Thus, by decreasing commuting costs, capital returns in other sectors or other regions
and indirect utility when buyers do not travel to market widen the initial points which
can become  =  = 1. Though a simple calculation, we obtain
@
@c
R 0, 4c R rt; @

@c
< 0;
@
@
< 0;
@
@
< 0.
In other words, lowering costs in order to sample a sellers product causes the initial pair
of  and  to be widened such that the  =  = 1 case emerges if commuting costs are
high. If products become more di¤erentiated  that is, if  increases- the initial pair of
 and  that reach  =  = 1 widens. Furthermore, we obtain
@
@N
< 0,
@
@L
=
@
@N
= 0 and
@
@L
< 0. (28)
These results can be summarized as the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The domain for the initial state to become a marketplace in equilibrium
widens as (1) transport costs are lowered, (2) opportunity costs to visit the marketplace
become lower, (3) opportunity costs to operate in a marketplace are lowered, and (4)
heterogeneities of taste increase. The inuence of search costs is ambiguous.
The four points in the above proposition suggest the possibility of forming a market-
place.
5 Conclusion
Ever since Wolinsky (1984), market formation involving a search process has been studied
by considering the location of the retailer. However, the circular causality between retailes
and buyers was not modeled in previous literature. This model can explain the formation
11Increasing  does not shift the saddle point to a new position.
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of a big marketplace in a developing economy as well as the di¢ culty in beginning to open
such a marketplace.
Our ndings can be summarized as follows: First, we found that a greater variety of
products purchased implies more sampling by buyers and higher prices for a product type
Indeed, the agglomeration of sellers provides higher prices for a variety, which is good for
sellers. More sampling suggests attractiveness to buyers. Second, the large opportunity
cost of buyers in visiting the marketplace, the large opportunity cost of capital returns, the
large costs of commuting to the marketplace, and the potentially small number on visitors
and sellers will constrain potential formation of a marketplace, even if these conditions
are restricted in the economy. Furthermore, a marketplace is not formed if either buyers
or sellers are small at the initial stage. Third, if buyer preferences are more heterogeneous
or if the commuting costs to the marketplace is lowered, the potential initial number of
buyers and sellers can be smaller for forming a marketplace. Fourth, the e¤ects of search
cost on forming a marketplace are ambiguous.
A limitation of our model is its geographic conguration. Extending the model to two
regions might explain the emergence of a core-periphery pattern, as in New Economic
Geography. Furthermore, our framework might be extended to incorporate referral into
the search process, as in Arbatskaya and Konish (2012).
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